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Symposium
THE EXPRESSIVE DIMENSION OF GOVERNMENTAL ACTION:
PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES
INTRODUCTION
DEBORAH HELLMAN*
The articles and commentaries contained in this issue were
presented at a Conference held on October 13-14, 2000, at the Uni-
versity of Maryland School of Law. The Conference was sponsored
jointly by this law school and by the Institute for Philosophy and Pub-
lic Policy at the University of Maryland and was funded, in part, by the
Pearl, Lawrence I. and Lloyd M. Gerber Memorial Lecture Fund. The
Conference, The Expressive Dimension of Governmental Action: Philosophi-
cal and Legal Perspectives, was designed to address the question whether
the expressive content of state action ought to have legal, and espe-
cially constitutional, significance. It was organized in response to
some recent Supreme Court cases in which the meaning or expressive
dimension of a law was judged to be constitutionally relevant. This
approach is significantly different from more familiar approaches to
assessing the constitutionality of laws or governmental practices.
Commonly, it is either the intent which motivated enactment of the
law or policy that matters or the effect that the law has on those whom
it touches that is relevant is assessing its permissibility. The claim that
what state action expresses ought to matter is thus both novel and
provocative.
In order to address the question-whether the expressive dimen-
sion of state action ought to be constitutionally relevant-it is impor-
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tant to first examine a more basic philosophical question: is the
expressive dimension of action, generally, morally significant? And if
so, when and for what reasons? The articles of Simon Blackburn and
Marcia Baron focus on these questions. In pursuing this inquiry, it
became necessary to distinguish the reasons why the meaning of ac-
tion might matter. In particular, an action's meaning might matter
because of the consequences of such expression, or it might matter in
itself-irrespective of whether that meaning is effectively communi-
cated to others and harms them in some predictable way. This issue is
relevant to controversies in the legal arena because some scholars who
believe that the expressive content of state action matters do so be-
cause of the harm caused by that expression-perhaps a state action
stigmatizes certain people. This reason for focusing on the expressive
dimension of law is not really expressivist. Rather, for those who adopt
the view that meaning matters when it harms, the focus of constitu-
tional inquiry is still on the effect of law rather than simply on its ex-
pressive content. My own article addresses this question by asking
whether there are nonconsequential reasons to criticize action with
certain expressive content.
With a clearer sense of the philosophical issues, Conference par-
ticipants then turned their attention to the legal arena. In particular,
the Conference addressed two questions: First, ought the meaning or
expressive content of state action to matter in assessing whether that ac-
tion violates constitutional guarantees-Equal Protection and non-Es-
tablishment, most especially? Second, if the meaning of laws matter,
how ought courts to determine what any particular law means? After
all, many controversial laws or policies are controversial precisely be-
cause people interpret them in significantly different ways. Steven
Smith's article addresses the first of these questions, and Shari Dia-
mond and Andrew Koppelman's article addresses the second.
Each of the writers submitted his or her article one month in
advance of the Conference, allowing ample time for an assigned com-
mentator to assess the ideas and arguments presented. As a result, the
discussion at the Conference was serious, thoughtful, and in-depth.
In the months following the event, both writers and commentators
had an opportunity to revise their work in light of this interaction.
The result-the series of articles and commentaries presented here-
was significantly improved thereby. On behalf of the other Confer-
ence sponsors at the University of Maryland School of Law and the
Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy, I hope you find this issue
interesting and thought-provoking.
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